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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes significant
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to identify cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other noteworthy cases. As
a special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the
Review.1 The following topics are included in the Review:
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1. The North Dakota Law Review Board of 2015–2016 would like to thank our Associate
Editors, Victoria Hicks and Jesse Liebe, and Managing Editor, Annique Lockard, for their hard
work in writing this North Dakota Supreme Court Review.
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REAL PROPERTY LAW—WATER RIGHTS—ACCRETION,
BOUNDARIES, AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS ....................... 479

AUTOMOBILES—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE—
STATUTES
Kroschel v. Levi
In Kroschel v. Levi,2 Kroschel appealed from the suspension of her
driving privileges.3 She claimed that the arresting officer, as an employee
of the North Dakota State University (“NDSU”) Police Department, did not
have jurisdiction to arrest her off-campus.4 The North Dakota Supreme
Court found the district court holding erroneous and reversed based on four
statutes.5 The court held that NDSU officers do not have jurisdiction to
arrest persons outside the NDSU campus under sections 40-20-05 and 1510-17(2) of the North Dakota Century Code (“Century Code”).6 The court
also held that section 44-08-24 only allows temporary assistance and
exchanging of officers.7 Lastly, the court concluded that section 54-40.3
did not authorize the agreement granting Haskell concurrent jurisdiction.8
The arresting officer, Haskell, believed he was acting under authority
granted by a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”).9 This was an
agreement between the Fargo and NDSU Police Departments, which stated
that Haskell had city-wide jurisdiction.10 The MOU was signed by the
NDSU President of Business and Finance, the Director of University Policy
and Safety of NDSU, the Fargo Interim Police Chief, and Fargo’s Mayor.11
The hearing officer found the MOU valid under sections 40-20-05 and
15-10-17(2) of the Century Code.12 The district court disagreed, finding
that the officer had authority under section 44-08-24(1) of the Century Code
but not under the statutes relied on by the hearing officer.13 The district
court also addressed section 54-40.3-04, stating that this section was
2. 2015 ND 185, 866 N.W.2d 109.
3. Kroschel, ¶ 1, 866 N.W.2d at 111.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 37, 866 N.W.2d at 121.
6. Id. ¶ 36.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 3, 866 N.W.2d at 111.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶¶ 8-11, 866 N.W.2d at 113, 114.
13. Id. ¶ 5, 866 N.W.2d at 112.
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inapplicable because it only authorized agreements made between North
Dakota and another state.14 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it
will not affirm the district court if “the order is not in accordance with the
law.”15 The North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed the four statutes
involved in the previous decisions to determine its holding.16
First, the court reviewed the hearing officer’s interpretation of section
40-20-05.17 Although the hearing officer read the statute to allow the chief
of police to give their officers jurisdiction throughout Fargo, the North
Dakota Supreme Court highlighted that this authority may only be granted
under the chief’s supervision.18 Since Officer Haskell was not under the
supervision of the Fargo Police Department, the court found section 40-2005 did not give him authority.19
Second, the court referenced section 15-10-17(2)20 under which the
administrative hearing found authority for the board of higher education to
approve concurrent jurisdiction.21 However, the statute limits this power so
that the board of higher education may only authorize concurrent
jurisdiction “at its institutions.”22 The court found this language as clear
evidence that the board may not authorize jurisdiction off-campus.23
Therefore, the arrest was also not authorized under section 15-10-17.24
Third, the supreme court reviewed section 44-08-24(1) of the Century
Code,25 which the district court determined to authorize Haskell to make the
arrest of Kroschel.26 This statute grants the assistance and exchange of
peace officers among criminal justice agencies in North Dakota on a

14. Id.
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2013).
16. Kroschel, ¶ 5, 866 N.W.2d at 112.
17. Id. ¶ 8, 866 N.W.2d at 113 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-20-05 (2013)).
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 10, 866 N.W.2d at 114.
20. The statute stipulates the powers of the board of higher education, including the power to
“authorize the employment of law enforcement officers having concurrent jurisdiction with other
law enforcement officers to enforce laws and regulations at its institutions.” N.D. CENT. CODE §
15-10-17 (2013).
21. Kroschel, ¶ 12, 866 N.W.2d at 114.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. ¶ 33, 866 N.W.2d at 120.
25. “Any appointive or elective agency or office of peace officers, as defined in § 12-63-01,
may establish policies and procedures or enter agreements with other agencies and offices and a
state or local criminal justice agency of this state may establish policies and procedures or enter
agreements with other criminal justice agencies of this state to: (a) assist other state and local
criminal justice agencies; and (b) exchange the criminal justice agency’s peace officers with peace
officers of another criminal agency on a temporary basis.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-08-24(1)
(2013).
26. Kroschel, ¶ 13, 866 N.W.2d at 114.
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temporary basis.27 The district court determined that the term “on a
temporary basis” referenced the exchange of officers but did not apply to
the assistance of intrastate officers.28 Kroschel argued that the term “on a
temporary basis” is intended to apply to both the assisting and the
exchanging of officers.29
The court settled this dispute by using the rule of interpretation
directing the court to read related statutes together and attempt to find a
common meaning among them.30 The court referenced section 44-08-20,
which also authorized “additional powers of peace assistance in a particular
. . . violation of law.”31 Subsection 3 of this statute clarifies that this
assistance may only be given upon request and only for a non-continual
basis.32 Another similar statute construes “assistance” as temporary.33 The
North Dakota Supreme Court found the statutes as evidence that the
legislature intended to make assistance of criminal justice agencies to be
temporary only, 34 and therefore section 44-08-24(1) did not give Haskell
authority.35
Fourth, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s
analysis of section 54-40.3-04.36 The court found that the district court
erred in concluding that the statute required the agencies to be interstate to
form an agreement.37 The court noted that section 54-40.3-01 clarifies that
a political subdivision may enter into an agreement with another political
subdivision of this state.38 Therefore, the statute does authorize intrastate
agreements between political subdivisions.39
The document was signed by a political subdivision and the NDSU
Police Department, an institutional subdivision, as required under 54-40.304.40 However, the section also requires a signature by the governing
body.41 Therefore, the MOU needed to be signed by the board of higher

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. ¶ 15, 866 N.W.2d at 115.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Martin v. Stutsman Cty. Soc. Servs., 2005 ND 117, ¶ 13, 698 N.W.2d 278, 281.
Kroschel, ¶ 19, 866 N.W.2d at 115-16.
Id.
State v. Demars, 2007 ND 145, ¶ 10, 738 N.W.2d 486, 489.
Kroschel, ¶ 21, 866 N.W.2d at 116-17.
Id. ¶ 19, 866 N.W.2d at 116.
Id. ¶ 27, 866 N.W.2d at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id.
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education and the attorney general.42 Since the attorney general did not
sign the MOU, the document was deficient and did not authorize officer
Haskell to arrest Kroschel.43
Since the four statutes evaluated by the lower courts failed to give
authority, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
holding.44 Kroschel urged the court to grant her attorney’s fees.45 The
court found that, in order for the court to award Kroschel attorney fees, she
must prove that the Department acted without substantial justification.46
Century Code section 28-32-50 provides that substantial justification must
be proven by showing the officer was “justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.”47 Since both the hearing officer and the
district court found a reasonable basis in law and fact that the officer had
authority, substantial basis was satisfied here.48

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.3-01(2) (2013).
Kroschel, ¶ 32, 866 N.W.2d at 120.
Id. ¶ 36, 866 N.W.2d at 121.
Id. ¶ 34, 866 N.W.2d at 120.
Id.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. at 121.

442

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:437

AUTOMOBILES—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
Beylund v. Levi
Beylund v. Levi,49 presented a question of first impression as to whether
the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth Amendment under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.50 Beylund appealed from a district
court judgment, which affirmed the Department of Transportation decision
to suspend Beylund’s driving privileges for two years.51 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision, finding that the criminal
refusal statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.52
After being read the implied consent advisory, Beylund consented to a
chemical blood test.53 The test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.250
g/100ml.54 Beylund argued the chemical test was an unconstitutional
warrantless search and the implied consent law violates the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.55 The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the
decision de novo as required for constitutional challenges.56
The
presumption of constitutionality must be rebutted beyond a reasonable
doubt in order for the statute to be found invalid.57
“A person may not drive . . . if . . . that individual refuses to submit to a
chemical test . . . to determine the alcohol concentration . . . in the
individual’s blood, breath, or urine.”58 The refusal to submit to such test is
“punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence” under
Century Code section 39-20-01.59 Since the chemical test is a search under
the Fourth Amendment, the court determined whether the implied consent
law is an unconstitutional condition.60

49. 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d. 403.
50. Beylund, ¶ 1, 859 N.W.2d. at 406.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. ¶ 3, 859 N.W.2d. at 406.
54. Id.
55. Id. ¶ 5. Beylund also argued the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth Amendment
or article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, which the court dismissed based on
rationale given in State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302. Beylund, ¶ 1, 859 N.W.2d. at
406.
56. Beylund, ¶ 8, 859 N.W.2d. at 407.
57. Id. ¶ 17, 859 N.W.2d. at 409.
58. Id. at 410. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (2013))
59. Id.
60. Id.
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The unconstitutional condition doctrine provides that ordinarily the
“government may not grant a benefit conditioned on the surrender of a
constitutional right even if the government may withhold the benefit
altogether.”61 The government may impose conditions on the right so long
as those conditions are reasonable.62 The court agreed with the Minnesota
Supreme Court in finding that “in order to proceed with a claim of
unconstitutional conditions, the defendant must show the criminal refusal
statute authorizes an unconstitutional search.”63 The court then referred to
its analysis in State v. Birchfield64 to determine the statute’s reasonableness
through the balancing test.65 The governmental interest in lowering drunk
driving rates is significant.66 Also, the implied consent laws protect against
suspicionless requests for chemical tests.67
The court noted that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
invalidates laws only if the condition is not significantly relevant to the
governmental interest.68 The criminal refusal statute satisfies this standard
because it deters drunken driving, induces drivers to take the test, and
removes drunk drivers from the road.69 Finally, the court determined that
the state interest is related to the privilege of driving, making the implied
consent laws reasonable.70 The court urged that the driver may avoid
harsher punishment by refusing to submit to the chemical test and also that
a driver’s expectation of privacy is lowered while driving a vehicle.71 For
these reasons, the court affirmed that district court judgment having
determined the statute was not unconstitutional72 under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.73

61. Id. ¶ 18. (citing 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 411 (2009) & Supp. 2014)).
62. Id.
63. Id. ¶ 22, 859 N.W.2d. at 412. (citing State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn.
2009)).
64. 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302.
65. Beylund, ¶ 23, 859 N.W.2d. at 412.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. ¶ 25, 859 N.W.2d. at 413.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 27, 859 N.W.2d. at 413-14.
71. Id. at 414.
72. At the time of writing, this case, along with State v. Birchfield and a Minnesota
companion case, was on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States with it being argued
that these statutes were unconstitutional. U.S. Supreme Court Hearing N.D. Cases on April 20,
N.D. SUP. CT., http://www ndcourts.gov/court/news/USSupremeCourtND 2016 htm.
73. Beylund, ¶ 30, 859 N.W.2d at 414.
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CHILD SUPPORT—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE—
APPEAL AND ERROR
Schiele v. Schiele
In Schiele v. Schiele,74 Bradley Schiele appealed from an amended
divorce judgment, which required Bradley to pay child support for his child,
C.B.S.75 The court found that Bradley could not prove that his child
support should be offset based on benefits C.B.S. was receiving from the
government.76 The court also held that the divorce judgment controlled to
determine that Brenda has primary residential responsibility.77
Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court
decision.78
After the divorce judgment, Brenda filed to have a court order Bradley
to pay child support.79 Although the child is autistic and lives at the Life
Skills and Transition Center (“Center”), the district court approved,
requiring that Bradley give $2,053 per month to Brenda as child support.80
Bradley moved to amend this judgment on the basis that since the child
lives with neither party, neither party should be considered to have primary
residential responsibility of C.B.S.81 The district court determined this
motion to be untimely and unsupported by facts and accordingly denied the
motion.82 Bradley then appealed, stating that he has no obligation to pay
child support while C.B.S is living at the Center and that his child support
should be offset by C.B.S’s benefits.83
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the standard of review for
child support determinations is de novo for questions of law.84 The court
referred to the guidelines for child support under N.D. Administrative Code
section 75-02-04.1.85 Subsection 02(9) of that section provides that child
support is appropriate when the parents do not live together.86 The court

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

2015 ND 169, 865 N.W.2d 433.
Schiele, ¶ 1, 865 N.W.2d at 435.
Id. ¶ 18, 865 N.W.2d at 438.
Id. ¶ 13, 865 N.W.2d at 439.
Id. ¶ 1, 865 N.W.2d at 435.
Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 435-36.
Id. ¶ 29, 865 N.W.2d at 441.
Id. ¶ 6, 865 N.W.2d at 436.
Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 435-36.
Id. ¶ 4, 865 N.W.2d at 436.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d at 437 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-02(9) (2015)).
Id.
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found that under this statute child support is appropriate for the case at
hand.87
On appeal, Bradley first argues that Brenda should not be considered
the primary caregiver.88 North Dakota legislation directs the court to
consider the primary caregiver as the parent who acts as such more often
than the other parent.89 The court noted Boumont v. Boumont,90 which held
that “the divorce judgment’s language controlled regardless of the parties’
actual practices.”91 This was done to promote a bright line rule.92
Therefore, because the divorce judgment gave Brenda primary residential
responsibility of the parties’ children, the supreme court concluded the
district court correctly followed the divorce decree.93
Secondly, Bradley claims that his child support obligation should be
offset by the benefits that C.B.S. receives from Medicaid and Supplemental
Security Income.94 He relied on N.D. Administrative Code section 75-0204.1-02(11), which provides “[a] payment of children’s benefits made to or
on behalf of a child who is not living with the obligor must be credited as a
payment toward the obligor’s child support obligation.”95 He noted that
these benefits include those resulting from the parent-child relationship but
do not include payments from “public assistance programs that are means
tested.”96 Bradley argued that the benefits C.B.S. receives are not “means
tested”97 but are a derivative of the parent-child relationship.98 However,
since he raised the issue for the first time on appeal, the court waived the
claim.99
The court followed Norberg v. Norberg,100 which held that child
support obligations would not be offset by benefits that are not attributable
to the obligor.101 The court found no evidence that C.B.S.’s benefits were
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 6, 865 N.W.2d at 436.
89. A parent will be considered to have primary residential responsibility if he or she “acts as
the primary caregiver on a regular basis for a proportion of time greater than the obligor.” N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(9) (2015).
90. 2005 ND 20, 691 N.W.2d 278.
91. Schiele, ¶ 12, 865 N.W.2d at 438.
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶ 13.
94. Id. ¶ 14.
95. Id. ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d at 437.
96. Id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(3) (2015)).
97. The court defines means tested as benefits that are unrelated to income. Id. ¶ 18, 865
N.W.2d at 439.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 16, 865 N.W.2d at 439.
100. 2014 ND 90, 845 N.W.2d 348.
101. Schiele, ¶ 17, 865 N.W.2d at 439.
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attributable to Bradley.102 Therefore, it affirmed the district court decision
that Bradley’s child support obligation will not be offset by the benefits
C.B.S. receives.103
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority because the district court
correctly followed the law, although the justice agreed with the logic of the
dissent.104 McEvers noted that the presumption that the amount of child
support is correct may be rebutted if the party can show that the child
support agency’s criteria prove that the amount is incorrect.105 However,
Justice McEvers states that none of the child support agency criteria apply
to the facts of this case.106 Justice McEvers also noted that Bergman v.
Bergman107 cannot be followed because the guiding authority has changed
since the case was decided.108 The North Dakota legislature narrowed the
criteria for rebutting the presumptive amount, making it exclusive.109
McEvers determined the change of law to be a clear indication that North
Dakota intended the rebuttable presumption to be narrow.110 As a result,
the rebuttable presumption cannot be applied to the case at hand.111
Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority.112 Justice Sandstrom
finds a rebuttable presumption appropriate because “neither parent is in fact
supporting the child.”113 Sandstrom noted that the child support guidelines
“assume that one parent acts as a primary caregiver.”114 Since that is not
the case here, Sandstrom found the result to be incorrect.115 Further,
Sandstrom noted that above all, the interpretation of the statutes must be
reasonable.116 The justice found it unreasonable to require a parent to pay
$2,053 in child support when the recipient is paying $200–$300 in actual
support of the child.117 Therefore, he would reverse the district court.118

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. ¶ 19
Id. ¶ 22, 865 N.W.2d at 440 (McEvers, J., concurring).
Id. ¶ 23 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.7(4) (2013)).
Id.
486 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1992).
Schiele, ¶ 24, 865 N.W.2d at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27, 865 N.W.2d at 441 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 33, 865 N.W.2d at 442 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-02-04.1-02(1) (2015)).
Id.
Id. ¶ 34 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05(33) (2013)).
Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 865 N.W.2d at 441.
Id. ¶ 34, 865 N.W.2d at 442.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
State v. Birchfield
In State v. Birchfield,119 Danny Birchfield appealed from a criminal
judgment for refusing to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol
concentration in his blood.120 Birchfield argued on appeal that North
Dakota’s criminal refusal statute is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and article 1, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.121
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court criminal
judgment, finding that the criminal refusal statute does not violate rights
under the Fourth Amendment or the North Dakota Constitution.122
Challenges of constitutionality are fully reviewable on appeal.123 All
enacted statutes are presumed to be constitutional, requiring that the
challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the statute contravenes the
constitution.124 This strong presumption requires the invalidity of the
statute to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the challenging party.125
The statute that Birchfield challenged was the criminal refusal provision
which states, “A person may not drive . . . if . . . that individual refuses to
submit to a chemical test . . . to determine the alcohol concentration . . . in
the individual’s blood, breath, or urine.”126
The court recognized that driving is not a constitutional right and may
be “subject to reasonable control by the State under its police power.”127
The chemical test to which Birchfield refused may only be administered
after the individual is arrested.128 A person may refuse the chemical testing,
but refusal is “a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the
influence.”129 Chemical tests to determine a person’s blood alcohol
concentration are considered searches for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, which protects the individual from unreasonable searches and
seizures.130

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302.
Birchfield, ¶ 1, 858 N.W.2d at 303.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 5, 858 N.W.2d at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
Id. ¶ 7. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (2013)).
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (2013)).
Id. ¶ 8.
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The court cited Missouri v. McNeely,131 which held that the dissipation
of alcohol in the bloodstream would not justify a per se warrantless blood
test.132 The decision was based in part on the fact that all fifty states have
adopted implied consent laws that allow for evidence to be secured without
a warrantless search.133 The North Dakota Supreme Court subsequently
held that the implied consent laws do not coerce or render consent
involuntary since the individual is presented with a choice.134
Based on these findings, the court noted that the statute must be
reasonable to maintain its validity.135 It was a question of first impression
in North Dakota if the criminal refusal statute violates the Fourth
Amendment.136 Birchfield cited no case that struck down criminal refusal
statutes.137 In fact, the court found that the statutes have survived Fourth
Amendment challenges in other states.138
The court determined the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment
infringement by “balancing the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests with the intrusion on an individual’s privacy.”139 It found the
governmental interest to be compelling since decreasing drunk driving is a
valid public concern.140 Further, the intrusion upon the individual’s privacy
is minimal based on the driver’s lowered expectation of privacy when
driving a vehicle.141 Also, the court acknowledged that the driver may
avoid “enhanced penalties for being highly intoxicated” if he or she chooses
to refuse to the chemical testing.142 The court found this analysis sufficient
to prove that the criminal refusal statutes were reasonable and therefore
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 8 of the
North Dakota Constitution.143

131. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
132. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568.
133. Birchfield, ¶ 10, 858 N.W.2d at 306.
134. Id. ¶ 11.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 12.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 17, 858 N.W.2d at 309.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 19, 858 N.W.2d at 310. At the time of writing, this case, along with Beylund v.
Levi and a Minnesota companion case, was on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
with it being argued that these statutes were unconstitutional. U.S. Supreme Court Hearing N.D.
Cases on April 20, N.D. SUP. CT., http://www ndcourts.gov/court/news/USSupremeCourtND
2016 htm.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONTRACTS—ESTOPPEL
Savre v. Santoyo
In Savre v. Santoyo,144 Savre leased two parcels of land from Santoyo
for the purpose of running his auto repair business.145 The lease was signed
on June 15, 2008, for a two-year term with a mid-lease rent increase.146
Around the time of the rent increase, the parties entered into a “Lease to
Purchase Option Agreement,” which would allow Savre to lease the two
parcels for a period of time and then purchase the property if certain
conditions were met.147 The agreement, signed July 15, 2009, specified the
option term, a notice requirement, a purchase price, an exclusivity of option
clause, a financing disclaimer, remedies upon default, and a modification
clause.148 The lease stated that monthly rent payments were due on the first
of each month, but Savre was frequently late.149 Santoyo accepted the late
payments and did not indicate to Savre in writing any intent to terminate the
lease on that basis.150
In preparation for purchasing the property, Savre set up JDDS, LLC, to
use as a financing entity; however, Savre did not attempt to assign, convey,
delegate, or transfer the purchase option to JDDS.151 Savre gave notice to
Santoyo of his intent to purchase the property on December 21, 2012, and
February 27, 2013, with no response from Santoyo.152 After Santoyo
refused to sell him the property, Savre stopped making monthly payments,
and Santoyo initiated eviction proceedings.153 The district court granted the
eviction, entering judgment against Savre for unpaid rent and Santoyo’s
costs and disbursements.154 By the end of June 2013, Savre vacated the
property, began leasing from someone else, and brought this lawsuit against
Santoyo.155 Savre argues that Santoyo was unjustly enriched by breaking
the option agreement, but Santoyo denied the allegations and
counterclaimed for damages to the property upon eviction.156 The district
court found Santoyo breached the option purchase agreement, awarding
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

2015 ND 170, 865 N.W.2d 419.
Savre,¶ 1, 865 N.W.2d at 421.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id at 422-23.
Id. ¶ 4, 865 N.W.2d at 423.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.

450

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:437

Savre $31,996 in damages for overpayments under the lease agreement but
denied any additional lost profits damages.157 The court also dismissed
Santoyo’s counterclaim for failing to meet his burden of proof.158
General contract rules also apply to leases. Therefore, the goal of
contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intent, from the written
language alone if possible.159 The appellate court independently examines
the contract, but whether a party has breached is a finding of fact subject to
the clearly erroneous standard.160 A breach occurs when there is
nonperformance of a contractual duty when it is due.161
First, Santoyo argues that the district court should not have concluded
Santoyo had a duty to sell to a third party with no rights and not even in
existence at the time of the agreement.162 Alternatively, Santoyo states that
neither Savre nor JDDS ever had sufficient financing to complete the
transaction.163 The court disagreed, however, finding that it was Savre
alone who paid extra payments under the lease and exercised the purchase
option in December 2012 and February 2013.164 Since the agreement did
not require financing to be in place for Savre to finalize the purchase, Savre
had completely performed under the contract until Santoyo failed to
respond in any way to Savre’s notice.165 Since Savre exercised the option
and made no effort to transfer or convey the option to JDDS, Savre fully
performed, and the district court did not err in finding Santoyo’s lack of
response as a breach of the agreement.166
Second, Santoyo argues that the district court was incorrect in finding
that he had waived strict compliance to the option agreement’s terms by his
conduct even though the agreement required any waiver to be in writing.167
Normally, strict compliance is required for purchase option contracts, but a
waiver of contractual rights is possible.168 A waiver can be established by
either express agreement or via inference from acts or conduct, such as an
unexplained delay in enforcing contractual rights or accepting performance
different than expected under the contract.169 The court looked to Corbin
157.
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on Contracts section 40 to note that in option contracts, a requirement for
timely payments may be waived by acceptance of a delayed payment
without any further action.170 This waiver may operate even in the presence
of a non-waiver provision in the contract.171 Since Santoyo accepted the
increased rent payments, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
district court did not err in finding that Santoyo had waived strict
compliance with the option agreement.172
Lastly, Santoyo argues that the district court failed to make sufficient
findings of fact when it dismissed his counterclaim for damages to the
property.173 Under Rule 52(a)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure, a district court making findings of fact without a jury must state
conclusions of fact and law separately to allow the appellate court to
understand the ruling.174 Santoyo contends that a tremendous amount of
photographs and other evidence of the damage were introduced at trial and
that Savre himself agrees that some of the damage was caused by him.175
The supreme court agreed with Santoyo that the district court should have
provided a better factual basis for its ruling.176 Specifically, the court’s
opinion noted that Savre himself agreed with some of the damages, and
therefore, the district court’s findings of fact dismissing the counterclaim do
not sufficiently address it.177 Therefore, the court reversed as to this part
and remanded the case for further proceedings.178

170. Id.
171. Id. at 427.
172. Id. ¶ 25, 865 N.W.2d at 428.
173. Id. ¶ 26.
174. Id. ¶ 27.
175. Id. ¶ 28.
176. Id. ¶ 31, 865 N.W.2d at 429. After dismissing Savre’s claims for lost business profits as
speculative, the district court’s ruling only said, ″The same is true for the damages Santoyo
claimed. In addition, the Court does not find the testimony offered by Santoyo in support of the
claim for damages to be credible.″ Id. ¶ 30.
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CONTRACTS LAW—REMEDIES—AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc. v. Red River Trucking, LLC
In Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc. v. Red River Trucking, LLC,179 Red River
Trucking (“Red River”) brought a totaled truck to Peterbilt of Fargo
(“Peterbilt”) for repairs.180 Red River’s insurance company paid out the
value of the truck at $22,500, but Red River decided to keep the truck with
a salvaged title and repair it for $37,505.65 in cash upon completion.181
Although Peterbilt began repairing the truck, Peterbilt stopped repairs on
March 23, 2011, after Red River failed to pay a Peterbilt affiliate, Allstate
Peterbilt group, and due to the relative cost of the repairs compared with the
value of the truck.182 Peterbilt already had put $31,346.65 in repairs into
the truck, which was supposed to be completed by May 1, 2011.183
Peterbilt told Red River in March 2011 that no more repairs would be
completed until Red River paid half of the estimated repairs.184 Peterbilt
also offered to release the truck upon payment of repairs made through that
date.185 Red River declined to follow either option, and Peterbilt retained
possession of the truck.186
Peterbilt sued Red River for the value of the completed repairs under a
repairman’s lien.187 Red River denied Peterbilt had a valid lien and
counterclaimed for lost profits alleging Peterbilt breached the repair
contract.188 Peterbilt replied, saying that Red River failed to mitigate its
damages.189 The district court found that Peterbilt had a valid repairman’s
lien that entitled them to $31,346.65, which they could foreclose on via the
sale of the truck.190 However, the district court also found that Peterbilt
breached the repair contract when the truck was not repaired by May 1,
2011.191 The court also concluded that Red River failed to mitigate its
damages for the breach since Red River had another truck available which
could have been repaired.192 Therefore, the district court dismissed all of
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

2015 ND 140, 864 N.W.2d 276.
Peterbilt of Fargo, ¶ 2, 864 N.W.2d 278.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 864 N.W.2d at 278-79.
Id. ¶ 3, 864 N.W.2d at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.

2015]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

453

Red River’s $201,564 in claims of lost profits except for $390.66, which the
court found was caused by the two-month delay from Peterbilt’s breach of
contract.193
Red River moved to amend the ruling, arguing that the damages should
have been $39,042.63 instead of $390.66, but the motion was denied.194 On
May 9, 2014, Peterbilt submitted a proposed amended judgment of
$34,842.21 due to the remaining necessary repairs plus costs, which the
district court entered on May 13, 2014, and served on Red River on May
14, 2014.195 Red River appealed on July 7, 2014, and the truck was sold at
a sheriff’s sale on July 15, 2014.196
The Supreme Court of North Dakota first examined whether Red
River’s appeal was timely or moot.197 First, the court notes that the appeal
was timely because it was within sixty days of the May 14, 2014, notice of
entry of the amended judgment.198 The court considered Peterbilt’s request
to amend the judgment as a timely motion under the North Dakota Rule of
Civil Procedure 59, and therefore Red River had a full sixty days from the
time when it was served with notice of the entry of the amended
judgment.199 Second, the court determined that Red River’s appeal is not
moot due to the sheriff’s sale of the truck because the fundamental issue in
their appeal is the amount of damages, not the status of the truck.200
Next, the supreme court examined whether the district court properly
measured the damages.201 In North Dakota, section 32-03-09 of the
Century Code describes the measure of damages for a breach of contract as
“the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the
detriment proximately caused thereby or which in the ordinary course of
things would be likely to result therefrom.”202 The damages must be clearly
ascertainable in both their nature and origin.203 Furthermore, an injured
party has a duty to mitigate the damages if he can do so with reasonable
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 6.
195. Id. ¶ 7.
196. Id. at 280.
197. Id. ¶ 8.
198. Id. ¶ 11.
199. Id.
200. Id. ¶ 14, 864 N.W.2d at 281.
201. Id. ¶ 15. A trial court’s decisions related to the amount of damages is a finding of fact
subject to the clearly erroneous standard, which may occur if it is induced by an erroneous view of
the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made after examining the entire record. Id. ¶ 16. However, the
appellate court gives due regard to the trial court, and findings of fact are adequate if they give a
basis for the determination. Id.
202. Id. ¶ 17.
203. Id.
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exertion or trifling expense and can only recover damages for things which
he could not have avoided with reasonable effort.204
First, Red River’s attempts to argue that Peterbilt had the burden to
show Red River did not mitigate its damages.205 Additionally, Red River
argues that it should be presumptively reasonable for the nonbreaching
party to refuse to deal with the breaching party.206 The court dismissed
these claims as being new issues brought only on appeal. 207
Second, the court reviews whether enough evidence exists to show that
Red River failed to mitigate its damages, finding that the district court did
not err by holding that Red River could have taken reasonable efforts to
repair one of its two trucks in July 2011.208 Red River received a check for
$41,000 in July 2011, which could have been used to repair a truck at that
time, but instead Red River made the business decision to let the truck sit
idle until February 2013.209 Since Red River could reasonably have used
the money to repair the truck in July 2011, damages after that time are not
appropriate.210
Lastly, Red River argues that the district court erroneously based the
lost profits calculation on one year of maintenance costs rather than a threeyear average.211 The court declined the invitation to reweigh the evidence
after finding that the district court’s damages calculation was within the
range of evidence presented at trial.212

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 864 N.W.2d at 282.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 864 N.W.2d at 283-84.
Id. ¶ 24, 864 N.W.2d at 283.
Id. ¶ 25, 864 N.W.2d at 284.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 30.

2015]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

455

CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—HEARSAY IN GENERAL
State v. Guttormson
In State v. Guttormson,213 Guttormson argued that his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation had been violated after a jury found him
guilty of refusing to submit to an onsite screening test.214 The arresting
officer did not testify at Guttormson’s trial, but another officer on the scene
testified instead as to the arresting officer’s actions.215
Specifically, Guttormson first argues that an arresting officer for a
crime of refusal to submit to an onsite screening test must have formed an
opinion that the defendant’s body contained alcohol.216 Guttormson
believes that if the jury is allowed to infer the police officer’s opinion
through circumstantial evidence, his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation had been violated.217 Secondly, Guttormson suggests, similar
to the blood alcohol analyst in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,218 that the
admission of the officer’s squad car video and the non-arresting officer’s
testimony with regard to the implied consent advisory violates his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation.219
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that the
accused in criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.220
The Confrontation Clause prohibits
testimonial hearsay, a specific type of statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.221 If a statement is offered to show that it was
spoken, it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and cannot be
hearsay.222 A testimonial statement has not been specifically defined by the
United States Supreme Court but arises in ex parte in-court testimony,
extrajudicial statements made in formalized materials, and “statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.”223
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Justice Sandstrom’s majority opinion notes that the non-arresting
officer’s testimony regarding the arresting officer’s recitation of the implied
consent advisory and the breath test request were only introduced to verify
that the verbal act occurred.224 The evidence that the advisory was given
was not offered to prove as true the statements within the advisory.225
Guttormson’s second argument that the silent video and non-arresting
officer’s testimony constitute surrogate evidence forbidden by Bullcoming
was also rejected by the court.226 In Bullcoming, a forensic report analyst,
familiar with the testing process, testified in place of the actual analyst who
had tested the defendant’s blood in a felony DUI case.227 The North Dakota
Supreme Court distinguished Bullcoming because Guttormson’s situation
involved a police officer who had participated and observed in all relevant
portions of the encounter.228 Furthermore, the court notes that the silent
squad car video is not testimonial in nature because it is not intended as an
assertive statement.229 To be a statement, nonverbal conduct must be
intended as an assertion, and nonassertive conduct is not a statement and
therefore not hearsay.230 Instead, the arresting officer’s actions in the video,
such as activating the overhead lights, pointing across the street, gesturing
toward the defendant, and arresting Guttormson, were offered as
circumstantial evidence of the arresting officer’s opinion and conduct.231
Lastly, Guttormson argued that the evidence was not sufficient to
support a conviction for a refusal to submit to an onsite screening test
because the arresting officer’s opinion could not be inferred from the
circumstantial evidence.232 In affirming the district court opinion that
sufficient evidence existed, the Supreme Court of North Dakota pointed to
the fact that the silent video showed the defendant’s car driving on the
center line immediately preceding the stop.233 Furthermore, the nonarresting officer’s testimony as to the defendant’s poor balance, swaying,
and difficulty in standing allowed the jury to infer the presence of a traffic
violation and alcohol consumption via circumstantial evidence.234 Since the
supreme court rejected all of Guttormson’s arguments, the court found that
224.
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Guttormson’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not violated and
sufficient evidence existed to convict him.235
Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice McEvers each concurred
specially with the decision in this case. The Chief Justice noted that he
“believe[s] it is injudicious to not call the arresting officer as a witness . . .
if that officer is available.”236 In cases similar to this, a significant risk
exists that the non-arresting officer on the witness stand will be asked a
question for which the answer would violate the Confrontation Clause.237
The case will be likely to either fail on appeal if the question is answered or
fail in the district court if the objection is sustained.238
Justice McEvers, on the other hand, disagreed with the Chief Justice’s
characterization of not calling the arresting officer as a witness as
Instead, Justice McEvers emphasized prosecutorial
“injudicious.”239
discretion in selecting witnesses.240 Additionally, the justice was concerned
about the case’s jury instructions, which required a showing of the reason
for the stop and that the officer formed an opinion that the defendant’s body
contains alcohol.241 Since section 39-08-01 of the Century Code, the
driving under the influence statute, does not make the lawfulness of the stop
an element of the crime, the lawfulness of the stop should not be an element
of the crime of refusing to submit to an onsite screening test.242

235. Id. ¶ 22, 869 N.W.2d at 745. The court actually remanded the judgment to the district
court to correct the judgment since Guttormson was originally convicted under the wrong law and
should have been convicted under section 39-08-01(1)(e)(3) of the Century Code. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 24 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
237. Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—PLAIN VIEW
State v. Zacher
In State v. Zacher,243 Brett Zacher appealed from a district court order
denying his motion to suppress evidence and a criminal judgment entered
after a conditional guilty plea for being in possession of a controlled
substance.244 A Mandan police officer saw Zacher fail to stop at a sign on
April 6, 2014.245 The officer stopped Zacher after discovering that Zacher
had a suspended license.246
After arresting Zacher for driving under suspension and placing him in
the police vehicle, the officer informed Zacher of his Miranda rights and
offered to move Zacher’s vehicle so that it would not be towed.247 Zacher
gave the officer permission to move his car from the parking lot, and as the
officer was moving it, he noticed the top portion of a small plastic bag
between the driver’s seat and middle console.248 The officer could not see
or identify the contents of the bag but was suspicious of it based on his
experience.249 The officer removed the bag and discovered it contained
“very small pieces of paper.”250 The officer was unable to identify the
contents, but another officer at the scene believed it contained LSD.251
When asked, Zacher stated the contents were fake acid, but upon inspection
at the police station, the officer confirmed that the bag contained LSD.252
When confronted, Zacher confirmed the LSD was real.253 Zacher was
charged with possession of a controlled substance for which he
conditionally pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to
suppress.254
Zacher argues the plain view doctrine does not apply and the bag
should not have been seized without a warrant.255 When reviewing a ruling
on a motion to suppress, the North Dakota Supreme Court defers to the
district court’s findings of fact and resolves any conflicts in testimony in
favor of affirmance; the court will affirm if “there is sufficient competent
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evidence fairly capable of supporting the court’s findings, and the decision
is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”256
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited, and a strong preference
for law enforcement officers to obtain warrants exists.257 A warrantless
search is not permissible, and any evidence obtained without a warrant must
be suppressed unless a recognized exception applies.258 The defendant has
the initial burden to show the evidence should be suppressed, but the burden
shifts to the state to show a recognized exception applies.259
The plain view exception states that “police officers may seize a clearly
incriminating object without a warrant if the officers are lawfully in a
position from which they view an object and the object’s incriminating
character is immediately apparent.”260 If contraband is left in open view
from a lawful vantage point of a police officer, no expectation of privacy
exists, and therefore no search as occurred.261 Since the officer in this case
had permission to enter the vehicle, the officer was in a lawful vantage
point.262 Therefore, the only remaining prong of the plain view exception is
the question of whether the incriminating nature of the plastic bag was
immediately apparent.263
Zacher argues that the incriminating nature was not immediately
apparent because the contents were not visible to the officer until he
removed it, a fact confirmed by the officer in testimony.264 The State
argues that officers do not need a “high degree of certainty as to the
incriminating character of evidence” but instead only need probable cause
to believe it is connected with criminal activity.265
The Supreme Court of North Dakota ultimately agreed with Zacher,
finding that under State v. Nickel,266 the object must not only be in plain
view, but its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent.267
Even if the object is in plain view, it may be subject to a search requiring
probable cause if the object or area where it is located bears no relationship
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to the reason for the police presence there.268 In this case, since the officer
was unable to identify the contents of the plastic bag before removing it and
was even unable to identify the illegality of the contents after removing it,
the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.269 The court
reversed the criminal judgment and held that the district court erred in
denying the motion to suppress.270

268. Id. ¶ 12.
269. Id. ¶ 13.
270. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—WARRANTLESS
SEARCH
State v. Williams
In State v. Williams,271 Williams sought review of a criminal judgment
after he conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver and drug paraphernalia.272 Williams alleged the use of a drugsniffing dog in a privately owned condominium hallway is a warrantless
and illegal search of the condominium’s curtilage.273 The North Dakota
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the non-exclusive nature of the
hallway pushed the area outside of the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.274
The Fargo Police Department, acting on intelligence that marijuana
was being sold out of Williams’s residence, brought a drug-sniffing dog to
investigate.275 Williams lived in a four-plex condominium building
surrounded by a fence with an open gate, and his individual residence
opened into a hallway that could be accessed from outside the building via
an unsecured common door.276 The dog entered the hallway, sniffing the
two doors present, but only alerted to the door to Williams’s residence.277
The dog handler testified that he could smell burnt marijuana upon entering
the hallway.278 The officers returned with a warrant to search the premises,
leading to drug charges against Williams.279 Williams conditionally pled
guilty to both charges, but reserved the right to appeal after the court
refused to suppress the evidence.280
In its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the Fourth
Amendment protects a home’s curtilage from unreasonable searches and
seizures.281 The court defined curtilage as the “area near a dwelling, not
necessarily enclosed, that generally includes buildings or other adjuncts
used for domestic purposes.”282 The United States Supreme Court case
United States v. Dunn283 outlines the factors to consider when determining
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whether a particular area is a part of a home’s curtilage.284 The factors
include the proximity of the home to the area, whether it is within an
enclosure surrounding the home, how the space is used, and any steps taken
to protect the area from observation by those passing by. 285 These factors
are not meant to be mechanically applied but answer whether the area in
question is “so intimately tied to the home itself” that it should be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures.286 However, the court noted that
the concept of curtilage is significantly modified when applied to a multifamily dwelling and proceeded to conduct a privacy analysis instead of
relying strictly on the Dunn factors.287
If an expectation of privacy exists, the government must obtain a
warrant before searching unless an exception applies.288 A reasonable
expectation of privacy occurs when the individual exhibits an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy, and society recognizes that expectation as
reasonable.289 Reasonableness depends on whether the individual has a
possessory interest in the searched location, whether the interest is
exclusory, whether the individual takes precautions to maintain privacy, and
whether the individual has a key.290
Williams argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
condominium hallway due to his possessory interest as a tenant in common
with the other condominium owners, the presence of a fence around the
property with the mailboxes outside the fence, and the placement of a plant
in the hallway’s window to limit visibility.291 In particular, Williams relied
on Florida v. Jardines,292 a case in which the police conducted a dog sniff
search of the front porch of a defendant’s home.293 The United States
Supreme Court found that the front porch in Jardines was a classic example
of curtilage based on property rights and declared the search invalid.294
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to State v. Nguyen295 for its
privacy analysis, finding that a search does not occur unless the right to
privacy is violated.296 In Nguyen, North Dakota’s highest court held that no
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expectation of privacy existed in the common hallway of a secured
apartment building.297 The Nguyen opinion distinguished Jardines because
Jardines relied on the traditional consideration of a porch as curtilage.298
Ultimately, the court found Williams’s property interest in the hallway
non-exclusive.299 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not directly
applied Jardines since it was decided, and other courts have reached
differing conclusions.300 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that
Williams’s condominium building looked and functioned very similarly to
an apartment building, such as in Nguyen, as opposed to a single-family
dwelling such as in Jardines.301 The court declined to overturn Nguyen and
held that an individual’s expectation of privacy is diminished in the
common areas of a multi-family dwelling.302 With a finding that the
common hallway of the condominium was outside the curtilage of
Williams’s home and that Williams did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in that area, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress the evidence.303
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CRIMINAL LAW—STATUTES—PROSTITUTION
State v. Rufus
In State v. Rufus,304 Galen Rufus appealed a criminal judgment that
found him guilty of human trafficking.305 His appeal challenged the
sufficiency of evidence and the classification of his offense as a AA
felony.306 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the district court
findings and affirmed Rufus’s conviction for human trafficking based on
sufficient evidence.307
Rufus responded to a Craigslist advertisement under “personal > casual
encounters” posted by “Chad Russo,” persona for a Ward County Deputy
Sheriff.308 The advertisement stated that Russo’s girlfriend “would be out
of town for the weekend” and her daughter “wanted to make some money
During two Yahoo Messenger
while her mother was gone.”309
conversations, Russo disclosed to Rufus the girl was fourteen years old.310
When Rufus asked if that was illegal, Russo acknowledged that fourteen
was illegal but assured Rufus that he would keep it confidential.311 Russo
sent Rufus a fictitious picture of his girlfriend’s alleged fourteen-year-old
daughter.312 The two men discussed pricing for specific sex acts, location,
and time to meet.313 They agreed to meet at 9 p.m. in a parking lot; Russo
would bring the girl, and Rufus would bring two bags of marijuana in
exchange for one hour with the girl.314 Russo told Rufus to bring condoms
if he wanted to have sex with the girl.315
When Rufus arrived at the agreed upon parking lot, he was arrested.316
His vehicle contained marijuana, money, a cooler containing beer, one
morphine pill, and one oxycodone pill.317 Rufus was charged with human
trafficking.318 He waived his right to a jury trial.319 In May 2014, at a
bench trial, he was convicted of human trafficking, a class AA felony.320
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

2015 ND 212, 868 N.W.2d 534.
Rufus, ¶ 1, 868 N.W.2d at 536.
Id. ¶ 3, 868 N.W.2d at 537.
Id. ¶ 1, 868 N.W.2d at 536.
Id. ¶ 2, 868 N.W.2d at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
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On appeal, Rufus argued that the evidence in his case was insufficient
for the district court to find that he committed the crime of human
trafficking.321 To support this position, Rufus made four arguments.322
First, he argued the court should review the facts and law of his case on a de
novo standard.323 Second, he contended the district court’s findings were
flawed.324 Third, he claimed his actions did not meet the elements of
human trafficking.325 Fourth, he argued his actions also did not constitute
an attempt to commit a crime.326
Addressing his first argument on the standard on which his appeal
should be reviewed, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated their standard
of review “does not vary depending on how much evidence in the form of
testimony was presented to the district court, and we are not persuaded to
adopt such an inconsistent, variable standard.”327 Rufus argued the de novo
standard was appropriate because the court had available “all of the
evidence in the record that was available to the district court.”328 The court
disagreed and did not review the case de novo.329
Next, Rufus argued that the evidence did not support the district court
findings.330 Specifically, Rufus stated that he did not suggest trading
marijuana for sexual services.331 In his view, Russo made the suggestion.332
Rufus also focused on the lack of condoms in his vehicle.333 Russo told
him to bring condoms if he wanted to have sex, and Rufus claims that the
lack of condoms showed his lack of intent to have intercourse.334 In
response to this argument, the court relied on State v. Steiger335 and State v.

319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. ¶ 4.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. ¶ 7, 868 N.W.2d at 538.
328. Id. ¶ 5, 868 N.W.2d at 537.
329. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 868 N.W.2d at 538.
330. Id. ¶ 8.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. 2002 ND 79, 644 N.W.2d 187. “Accordingly, this Court is not limited to the reasons a
trial court gives for a finding of guilt. Instead, we consider the entire record to decide whether
substantial evidence exists to support the conviction.” Steiger, ¶ 8, 644 N.W.2d at 190.
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Corman.336 In criminal cases, the court does not have to consider if the
district court findings are flawed because the court can review the entire
record; thus, they dismissed this argument as well.337
In support of his third argument, Rufus made three claims of
insufficient evidence to support his conviction.338 He specifically argued
that his actions of “making a date with a pimp to possibly have sex with an
underage prostitute” did not support the elements of the crime of human
trafficking.339 Rufus claimed there was also insufficient evidence to show
that he would have caused the girl to have sex with him.340 Lastly, he
argued the evidence was insufficient in regards to showing he had
“completed a substantial step toward committing the crime of human
trafficking or that he had the requisite intent to do so.”341
To address the elements of human trafficking argument, the North
Dakota Supreme Court relied on statutory interpretation principles.342 The
court has the authority to review statutes on appeal because it is a question
of law.343 The statutes at issue in this appeal were section 12.1-40-01(1)344
and section 12.1-40-03(3), (5).345 The district court found Rufus guilty of
human trafficking because he “bargained with another adult for the sexual
services of a fourteen-year-old girl, agreeing to exchange a quantity of
marijuana for an hour with the . . . girl.”346
The evidence showed that Rufus knew the girl’s age and because
sexual activities and prices were discussed, “he was purchasing her for
sexual activity.”347 The district court further found that Rufus knew what
he was doing was illegal and that he had taken a “substantial step toward
attempting the crime of human trafficking” when he showed up at the
parking lot with the agreed upon items.348 Accordingly, the district court
applied Century Code section 12.1-40-01(1)(b) to both the purchaser and
336. 2009 ND 85, 765 N.W.2d 530. “[W]e look to the evidence and reasonable inferences
most favorable to the verdict to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
conviction.” Corman, ¶ 8, 765 N.W.2d at 533.
337. Rufus, ¶ 10, 868 N.W.2d at 539.
338. Id. ¶ 11.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. ¶ 12, 868 N.W.2d at 539-40.
343. State v. Brossart, 2015 ND 1, ¶ 23, 858 N.W.2d 275, 285.
344. N.D.CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-01(1) (2013) (providing when a person is guilty of human
trafficking).
345. N.D.CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-03(3), (5) (2013) (defining human trafficking and sex
trafficking respectively).
346. Rufus, ¶ 13, 868 N.W.2d at 540.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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the supplier.349 Rufus’s position was that he attempted to obtain services
from the girl, not the girl herself, failing to meet the “obtain” portion of
section 12.1-40-01(1)(b).350
This case was the first time the North Dakota Supreme Court
interpreted section 12.1-40-01(1), thus the court turned to federal precedent
in United States v. Jungers351 for guidance.352 The defendants in Jungers
had a similar set of facts to Rufus.353 The Eighth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 in Jungers to both suppliers and purchasers of commercial sex.354
Rufus did not dispute that section 12.1-40-01(1) of the Century Code
applied to purchasers, but he remained adamant that he had not sought to
obtain the girl herself.355 Relying on the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in
Jungers and accepted definitions of “obtain,” the North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed.356
Rufus’s fourth argument was that he did not attempt to commit a
crime.357 He relies on the argument that he was charged with the attempt of
obtaining a girl, not criminal attempt.358 The State argued that there was
enough evidence to show that Rufus did take a substantial step in
committing human trafficking, satisfying the statute and the precedent in
State v. Stensaker359 which Rufus relied on.360 To be guilty of human
trafficking, the North Dakota Supreme Court said the State had to provide
evidence that Rufus “(1) acted with the kind of culpability required for
commission of the crime of human trafficking and (2) intentionally engaged
in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of
human trafficking.”361 The court applied the culpability level of willfully to
this statute.362
In applying the statutory meaning of “obtain” to the facts of this case,
the court held that Rufus did have the requisite intent to commit human
trafficking by inferring from his initial response to the Craigslist

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013).
Rufus, ¶ 16, 868 N.W.2d at 541.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18, 868 N.W.2d at 541-42.
Id. ¶ 20, 868 N.W.2d at 542.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. ¶ 21, 868 N.W.2d at 543.
Id.
2007 ND 6, 725 N.W.2d 883.
Rufus, ¶ 21, 868 N.W.2d at 542.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
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advertisement.363 The court further found downloading Yahoo Messenger,
bartering over rates, agreeing to the transaction, and appearing at the agreed
upon location with the agreed upon amount to exchange was sufficient
evidence to show Rufus “willfully” committed the crime.364 The court also
found that there was sufficient evidence to show Rufus intentionally
committed a substantial step towards completing the crime of human
trafficking.365 Finally, the court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to show Rufus knew the girl “would be subject to human
trafficking by causing the fourteen-year-old girl to engage in sexual acts or
sexual conduct.”366
Rufus’s final argument on appeal was for the court to reverse the
classification of his human trafficking conviction as a class AA felony.367
Rufus based this argument on the fact that he was never going to victimize
a real person.368 At the district court, he argued the lack of a real person
should go to the severity of the charge.369 The North Dakota Supreme
Court felt bound by what the Legislative Assembly authorized and upheld
the application of the offense classification authorized by Century Code
section 12.1-40-01.370 In conclusion, the court found sufficient evidence to
support Rufus’s conviction of human trafficking for attempting to obtain a
fourteen-year-old girl when he knew she would be subject to human
trafficking.371

363. Id. ¶ 23.
364. Id. at 543-44.
365. Id. ¶ 24, 868 N.W.2d at 544.
366. Id. ¶ 27.
367. Id. ¶ 29, 868 N.W.2d at 544-45.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 545.
370. Id. ¶ 31.
371. Id. ¶ 32. Since Rufus was charged, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly repealed
chapter 12.1-40 of the Century Code and enacted chapter 12.1-41 to address some of the concerns
of this case over charging purchasers as suppliers.
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
Feist v. Feist
In Feist v. Feist,372 the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the
district court’s division of the parties’ marital estate in the divorce
judgment.373 Thomas Feist appealed from the district court awarding all of
the mineral interests to Cheryl Feist.374 Cheryl Feist cross-appealed,
contending that she should have been awarded attorney fees.375 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the divorce judgment, holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the estate and
awarded Cheryl all of the mineral interests.376
Since marital distribution is treated as a finding of fact, the court would
reverse the lower court if it found the distribution to be “clearly
erroneous.”377 North Dakota defines a holding to be clearly erroneous if “is
induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support
it, or if, after reviewing all the evidence, [it is] left with a definite and firm
conviction a mistake has been made.”378 The division of the marital estate
must be equitable,379 which is determined by first finding the property’s
total value.380 The court will value the property as of the date of the trial
using the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.381
The court noted that although the factors of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines
favored neither party, the guidelines allow for discretion in evaluating other
important circumstances. 382 The court acknowledged van Oosting v. van
Oosting,383 which held that the property’s origin may be considered when
dividing the marital estate.384 This factor favors Cheryl because the mineral
interests were acquired through Cheryl’s inheritance from her parents.385

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

2015 ND 98, 862 N.W.2d 817, 817.
Feist, ¶ 1, 862 N.W.2d at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d at 823.
Id. ¶ 4, 862 N.W.2d at 820.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24(1) (2013).
Feist, ¶ 6, 862 N.W.2d at 820.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 821.
521 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1994)
Feist, ¶ 11, 862 N.W.2d at 821.
Id. ¶ 7, 862 N.W.2d at 820.
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Thomas’s argument on appeal was that the mineral interests may not be
solely awarded to Cheryl because their valuation is too speculative.386 He
urged that the division of the marital estate would only be equitable if he
received half of the future royalty payments from the mineral interests.387
Thomas supported his contention with Cheryl’s expert testimony, which
noted that the valuation of future pricing is “subject to unknown and
unpredictable market forces which cannot be determined with any level of
certainty.”388
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the valuation was
not clearly erroneous and affirmed the distribution of the mineral
interests.389 The North Dakota Supreme Court also denied Cheryl’s crossappeals.390 The court reasoned that, although Thomas spent a substantial
amount of money during the divorce and also failed to maintain the home,
the district court did not error when it distributed “the martial estate nearly
equally between the parties.”391 The court also held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Cheryl attorney fees.392

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. ¶ 8, 862 N.W.2d at 820-21.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 862 N.W.2d at 821-22.
Id. at 822.
Id. ¶ 19, 862 N.W.2d at 823.
Id. ¶ 15, 862 N.W.2d at 822.
Id. ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 823.
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INDIANS—REAL PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF WAY AND EASEMENTS
Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC
In a contract dispute, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and
remanded having concluded that the district court did have jurisdiction over
the breach of contract and construction lien case between Arrow Midstream
Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (“Arrow”), Tesla Enterprises,
LLC (“Tesla”), and 3 Bears Construction, LLC (“3 Bears”).393
Arrow had acquired a right-of-way easement over Indian Trust Land on
the Fort Berthold Reservation from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.394 Arrow
then hired 3 Bears, a business in New Town owned by two members of the
Three Affiliated Tribes, to be the general contractor for the construction of
a pipeline on the easement.395 3 Bears in turn contracted with Tesla, a
company based in Alaska, for materials and labor for the pipeline.396
Tesla filed a pipeline lien against Arrow over a dispute Tesala had with
3 Bears regarding work Tesla had completed but were not properly
compensated for.397 Arrow filed suit in district court disputing the pipeline
lien, seeking indemnification, and claiming that 3 Bears had also breached
its contract with Arrow.398 In district court, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.399 3 Bears then filed a complaint against
both Tesla and Arrow in Tribal Court seeking a declaration that the lien was
invalid, alleging that Arrow breached its contract with 3 Bears, and
requesting damages.400 The district court concluded that their jurisdiction
would infringe on Tribal sovereignty and Arrow and Tesla should have
exhausted their tribal court remedies before coming to the district court.401
The district court agreed with 3 Bears and dismissed the action without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.402
On appeal, 3 Bears denied the North Dakota Supreme Court
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it was dismissed by the district court
without prejudice.403 Relying on Winer v. Penny Enterprises,404 the
393. Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC, 2015 ND 302, ¶1, 873
N.W.2d 16, 17.
394. Id. ¶ 2, 873 N.W.2d at 18.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. ¶ 3.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. ¶ 4.
402. Id.
403. Id. ¶ 5.
404. 2004 ND 21, 674 N.W.2d 9.
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supreme court concluded that the action was appealable.405 Arrow argued
that the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction to decide this case and contended
the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction406 The supreme
court relied on Strate v. A-1 Construction,407 which held that without
congressional permission, Tribal Courts lack civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers or non-Indians on reservations.408 However, the court noted
Montana v. United States409 carved out two exceptions to this general
rule.410 The district court concluded that the first Montana exception of a
consensual relationship did not apply to this case because 3 Bears is not a
member of the tribe; rather, it is organized as a North Dakota company.411
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this decision was in-line with
the precedent of Airvator.412 For that reason, the court agreed with the
district court that the first Montana exception of a consensual relationship
did not apply to this case.413
The district court relied on the second Montana exception in
determining it lacked jurisdiction over this dispute.414 The district court
specifically determined that the pipeline right-of-way easement was not
“non-Indian fee land” and the dispute was over business activity, not
land.415 In response, Arrow relied on Strate to dispute this position.416 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held (1) granting rights-of-way over Indian
lands is a congressional power, (2) the Tribe did not refuse the pipeline or
reserve any rights to control the easement, and (3) relying on Adams417 and
Red Wolf,418 the right-of-way that Arrow acquired was non-Indian fee
land.419
To determine state court jurisdiction,420 the court turned to Williams v.
Lee,421 also noting their own precedent: “state court jurisdiction is
405. Arrow Midstream Holdings, ¶ 7, 873 N.W.2d at 19.
406. Id. ¶ 8.
407. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
408. Arrow Midstream Holdings, ¶ 12, 873 N.W.2d at 20.
409. 450 U.S. at 565-66.
410. Arrow Midstream Holdings, ¶ 12, 873 N.W.2d at 20.
411. Id. ¶ 13.
412. Id. ¶¶ 14-16, 873 N.W.2d at 21-22 (discussing Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain Mfg.
Co., 329 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1983).
413. Id. ¶ 17, 873 N.W.2d at 21.
414. Id. ¶ 18.
415. Id. at 21-22.
416. Id. ¶ 19, 873 N.W.2d at 22.
417. Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop, Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
418. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
419. Id. ¶¶ 21-24, 873 N.W.2d at 23-24.
420. Id. ¶ 19, 873 N.W.2d at 22-23.
421. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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foreclosed if it is preempted by incompatible federal law or if it would
undermine the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them.”422 3 Bears claimed they were properly under this precedent
by relying on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Constitution of the
Three Affiliated Tribes, the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, and the
Fort Berthold Tribal Code.423 The court noted that this gives the Tribe
powers to form their own government but does not preempt the state district
court from hearing this case.424 The supreme court specified that this case
pertained to the validity of a pipeline lien under state law and there was no
Tribal law to address pipeline liens.425 The court viewed this case as a
matter of contractual dispute between non-members of the Tribe on nonIndian fee land.426 For that reason, the court held the Tribal Court lacked
jurisdiction and the district court, not being foreclosed by any federal law,
had proper jurisdiction.427
The district court alternatively held that Arrow and Tesla should have
exhausted their Tribal Court remedies before taking their case to state
court.428
3 Bears supported that position by relying on various
precedents.429 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument and
declined to address it because it was “either unnecessary to the decision or [
] without merit.”430

422. Arrow Midstream Holdings, ¶ 25, 873 N.W.2d at 24 (quoting McKenzie Cty. Soc.
Servs. Bd. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399, 401-02 (N.D. 1986)).
423. Id. ¶ 26, 873 N.W.2d at 24-25.
424. Id. ¶ 27, 873 N.W.2d at 25.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. ¶ 28.
428. Id. ¶ 29.
429. Id. ¶ 30.
430. Id. ¶ 31.
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REAL PROPERTY LAW—DEEDS—AMOUNT OF CONVEYANCE
EOG Resources, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.
In EOG Resources, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co.,431 Soo Line appealed
a summary judgment ruling holding that Soo Line does not own minerals
under property in Mountrail County, quieting title to EOG Resources
instead.432 The district court held that seven private deeds did not convey a
fee simple title to Soo Line’s predecessor-in-interest, but only easements.433
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that six of the seven
deeds unambiguously granted fee simple title to the railroad and the seventh
deed, while ambiguous, should be remanded for trial.434
EOG filed a quiet title action claiming an interest in the minerals in the
disputed property.435 Soo Line argued that a condemnation order and seven
deeds executed in 1914, 1915, and 1916 by Henry Olson provided their
predecessor in interest, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway
Company, with a fee simple title to the surface and minerals of the
property.436 The district court concluded that the condemnation order and
the private deeds each granted Soo Line only an easement across the
property via its predecessor-in-interest.437 Although each deed’s granting,
warranty, and habendum clause language was consistent with a grant of fee
simple, the deeds included the term “right of way” in the title which created
uncertainty. 438 After examining other factors such as the size and shape of
the interest, the purpose of the conveyance, a release from damages clause
and extrinsic evidence, the district court quieted title to EOG Resources.439
Since the district court found in favor of EOG Resources on summary
judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the decision de novo
on the entire record, examining whether any genuine issues of material fact

431. 2015 ND 187, 867 N.W.2d 308.
432. EOG Resources, Inc., ¶ 1, 867 N.W.2d at 311. Soo Line has subsequently leased the
mineral rights to G-4, LLC, who was also a party to the litigation. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. ¶ 46, 867 N.W.2d at 322.
435. Id. ¶ 3, 867 N.W.2d at 311.
436. Id. ¶ 4, 867 N.W.2d at 312. G-4 filed a separate answer and cross-claims requesting
that the court quiet title in Soo Line based not only on the seven deeds but also under the March 2,
1899 Act of Congress. Id. ¶ 5. Subsequently in the litigation, the parties stipulated that the 1899
Act only provided the railroad with an easement, causing the court to dismiss G-4’s claims
regarding the 1899 Act. Id. ¶ 8.
437. Id. ¶ 12, 867 N.W.2d at 313.
438. Id.
439. Id.
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existed.440 Soo Line and G-4 did not appeal the district court’s ruling with
regard to the condemnation order but only the seven private deeds.441
In general, the court reviews deeds in the same way they interpret
contracts.442 The critical issue when interpreting a deed is ascertaining the
grantor’s intent, which should be ascertained from the writing alone if the
deed is unambiguous.443 A deed is ambiguous if “rational arguments can be
made in support of contrary positions as to the meaning of the term, phrase,
or clause in question.”444 If a deed is ambiguous, only then can a court
consider extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties.445 Generally,
if a deed is ambiguous and reasonable differences of opinion exist as to its
interpretation, summary judgment is not appropriate.446
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed EOG Resource’s
comparison of Lalim v. Williams County447 to this case. In Lalim, the North
Dakota Supreme Court examined whether a county acquired a fee simple
title or easement when purchasing land for highway purposes.448 The court
held that although the deed was “a warranty deed purporting to grant,
bargain, sell and convey” “all that tract or parcel of land and real estate,”
only an easement was conveyed because the plat created ambiguity and a
fee simple grant would have divided the grantor’s land.449 In distinguishing
the case, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Lalim involved a deed
between a private party and the government whereas the current case
involved only private parties.450 Furthermore, the deed language in Lalim
was significantly different from the language in the seven private deeds in
this case.451
Next, the court proceeded to examine each of the seven deeds, placing
them into three groups.452 The first group, containing five deeds, were
entitled “WARRANTY DEED—RIGHT OF WAY” and stated that the
grantors “do hereby, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and CONVEY” their
440. Id. ¶ 13.
441. Id. ¶ 14, 867 N.W.2d at 314.
442. Id. ¶ 15.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. ¶ 16.
446. Id.
447. 105 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1960).
448. EOG Resources, Inc., ¶ 18, 867 N.W.2d at 314.
449. Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 867 N.W.2d at 314-15. The property in Lalim was depicted on a “right of
way plat.” Id. ¶ 19, 867 N.W.2d at 315.
450. Id. ¶ 20.
451. Id.
452. Id. ¶ 22, 867 N.W.2d at 316. The court could do this because all of the deeds are on
pre-printed forms with similar provisions. Id. ¶ 21, 867 N.W.2d at 315.
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interest to the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway
Company.453 The specific language of the granting clause is most
important to determining the intent of the grantee, and a deed which
conveys a piece of land generally indicates an intent to convey a fee simple
title.454 More specifically, a deed limiting the use of a parcel to railroad
purposes may be considered an easement, while conveyances without
additional limiting language are usually construed as passing a fee simple
estate.455
Since the granting clause in this case does not limit the usage of the
property, it appears that a fee simple interest was conveyed, a theory that
the habendum and warranty clauses seem to support.456 The warranty and
habendum clauses do not limit the grant in any way, and similar clauses in
other disputes have been found to illustrate an intent to convey a fee simple
title.457 The court dismissed EOG Resources’ claim that the inclusion of
“right of way” in the title suggests less than a fee simple because the term
“right of way” has two meanings when used in railroad deeds.458 While
inclusion of “right of way” in the granting clause may indicate intent
contrary to a fee simple, its inclusion in the title has not been held to be a
significant factor.459 The court also dismissed EOG Resources’ claim that
the liability release clause indicates intent to grant less than a fee simple
because the release clause in this case relates to the property adjacent to the
granted property which the grantor continued to own.460 Since the language
of the deeds unambiguously granted a fee simple title to the railroad, the
court held no extrinsic evidence is permissible and reversed the district
court judgment.461
The Larson deed was the only one in the second group considered by
the court.462 First, the court noted that the inclusion of a prior easement
owned by the railroad in the Larson deed’s property description supports
the idea that a fee simple interest was intended to be granted.463 The court
also dismissed the idea that a release provision releasing the railroad from
453. Id. ¶ 22, 867 N.W.2d at 316.
454. Id. ¶ 24, 867 N.W.2d at 316-17.
455. Id. at 317.
456. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
457. Id. ¶ 26, 867 N.W.2d at 317-18.
458. Id. ¶ 29, 867 N.W.2d at 318.
459. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court also notes that the parties knew correct granting
language for easements because they used it in the portion of the deed granting an easement for
snow fences. Id. ¶ 30.
460. Id. ¶¶ 31-33, 867 N.W.2d at 319-20.
461. Id. ¶ 36, 867 N.W.2d at 320.
462. Id. ¶ 37.
463. Id. ¶ 39, 867 N.W.2d at 321.
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all claims for any damages or trespass committed during the construction of
the railway created any ambiguity in the deed.464 Since no ambiguity
existed, and the Larson deed contained the same granting, habendum and
warranty clauses of the five leases above, the court held that the Larson
deed conveyed a fee interest to the railroad.465
The final deed to be considered was the Faro deed, which contained the
same granting, warranty, habendum, release, and snow fence clauses as the
other six deeds, as well as the same title.466 Although the deed on its face
conveyed a fee simple, the property description is materially different than
the others because it carved out an exception for the non-railway land lying
on either side of the conveyance.467 Similar to Lalim above, the size and
shape of the conveyance created an ambiguity as to whether the intent was
to convey an easement or fee simple estate.468 Since it was ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence may be allowed; however, the district court’s inference
that in 1914, 1915, and 1916, “mineral interests probably interested no one”
was not allowed on a summary judgment motion.469 Therefore, as to the
Faro deed, the Supreme Court of North Dakota remanded it for further
proceedings.470
Chief Justice Vandewalle concurred and dissented, agreeing with the
majority that the Faro deed is ambiguous and that summary judgment
should be reversed.471 As to the other six deeds, Chief Justice Vandewalle
believed that the majority and dissent both made good arguments and
therefore would conclude that they were ambiguous and summary judgment
regarding any deed was improper; the Chief Justice would remand the
entire case regarding the other deeds for trial.472
Justice Sandstrom dissented with the majority opinion, primarily based
on the historical context.473 He notes that these deeds were meant to simply
accomplish what was normally conducted through condemnation and
federal appropriation, a result which normally only created an easement.474
Justice Sandstrom argues that the property description of the Olson deed,
which parallels the others, creates ambiguity because it describes “[a]ll that
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶¶ 37-41, 867 N.W.2d at 320-21.
Id. ¶ 42, 867 N.W.2d at 321.
Id.
Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 44, 867 N.W.2d at 322.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 867 N.W.2d at 323 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 54-57, 867 N.W.2d at 323-24 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 55, 867 N.W.2d at 323.
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part” of the land and talks of the “railroad as the same is now located over
and across.”475 Justice Sandstrom noted that once ambiguity is shown, the
court should examine the context and notice that the purpose was
undoubtedly to provide a right-of-way for the railroad.476 Since the railroad
could have taken only an easement by condemnation, Justice Sandstrom
argued there was a question of fact that should have been resolved by
trial.477

475. Id. ¶¶ 58-59, 867 N.W.2d at 324. He notes that this language should trump the
boilerplate language of the deeds. Id.
476. Id. ¶¶ 62-63, 867 N.W.2d at 324-25.
477. Id. ¶ 68, 867 N.W.2d at 325.
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REAL PROPERTY LAW—WATER RIGHTS—ACCRETION,
BOUNDARIES, AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall
In Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall,478 the Supreme Court of North
Dakota reviewed an appeal by Rocky Norby after the district court quieted
title to disputed property in James Kuykendall.479 The 96 acres of disputed
property is on the border between Montana and North Dakota in an area
where the Yellowstone River generally divides the parties, with Norby in
Montana and Kuykendall in North Dakota.480
Over time, the Yellowstone River has gradually moved east, eroding
land from the east bank and depositing (accreting) land to its west bank.481
At some point, the river moved into North Dakota, eventually leaving 96
acres of accreted land between the North Dakota-Montana border and the
west bank of the river.482 Neither party’s deeds represent the river as the
boundary of the property, except that deeds in the chain of conveyance for
the Kuykendalls state the conveyance as “less parts eroded” by or into the
river.483 Although the Kuykendalls have paid the real estate taxes on the
accreted land, the Norbys executed a quit claim deed conveying the land to
Rocky Norby in 2005 and brought an action in 2012 to eject the
Kuykendalls and quiet title in the Norbys.484
Norby argued in both the district court and supreme court that he
owned the land through the doctrine of riparian accretions.485 The
Kuykendalls answered, claiming that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations and laches.486 The district court, ignoring the Kuykendalls’
defenses, dismissed Norby’s argument noting that Norby does not own title
to land in North Dakota and cannot get property in the state by accretion.487
Since the district court found in favor of the Kuykendalls on summary
judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviews the decision de novo
on the entire record, examining whether any genuine issues of material fact
exist.488
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

2015 ND 232, 869 N.W.2d 405.
Norby, ¶ 1, 869 N.W.2d at 406.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. ¶ 7, 869 N.W.2d at 407.
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The majority opinion for the North Dakota Supreme Court first notes
that the border between Montana and North Dakota is fixed at the “twentyseventh meridian of longitude west from Washington.”489 The opinion then
goes on to describe the North Dakota statute regarding riparian rights.490
However, the majority notes that the statute is essentially a restatement of
the well-established common law rule governing riparian rights.491
At common law, the doctrines of accretion, dereliction, erosion, and
avulsion apply where title to real property describes a boundary line as a
body of water.492 If the boundary line is fixed by a line without reference to
a body of water, the grantee of a deed cannot claim accretions beyond the
line.493 The court notes that common sense supports the rule because
riparian landowners are subject to the risk of losses and gains caused by the
water.494 Past decisions have stressed that landowners whose land is
bounded by water may have riparian rights, but where land is bounded by
government lines, the North Dakota riparian statute does not apply.495
Norby argues that since the deeds in the Kuykendalls’ chain of title
state the conveyance is “less parts eroded [by or into] the Yellowstone
River,” he deserves the 96 acres by accretion.496 The court disagreed
because Norby’s own title does not include conveyance of any land in
North Dakota, and any plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their own title
in a quiet title action.497 Secondly, the court noted that the deeds in the
chain of title refer only to erosion as opposed to accretion, meaning that
“[e]xcepting land eroding into the river from the grant of property in the
Kuykendalls’ deeds did not amount to a conveyance of accretions located in
North Dakota to Norby.”498
The court dismissed Norby’s argument that their ruling runs contrary to
the rule that riparian rights have no regard for artificial boundaries, again
making reference to the fact that the property boundary in this case is fixed

489. Id. ¶ 8.
490. Id. The North Dakota statute says, “Where from natural causes land forms by
imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by
accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the
bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (2013).
491. Norby, ¶ 8, 869 N.W.2d at 407.
492. Id.
493. Id. ¶ 9, 869 N.W.2d at 408.
494. Id. ¶ 10.
495. Id. ¶ 11, 869 N.W.2d at 409-10.
496. Id. ¶ 12, 869 N.W.2d at 410.
497. Id.
498. Id.
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without reference to water.499 The majority affirmed the district court
ruling granting property interests to the Kuykendalls.500
Justice Sandstrom concurred in the judgment but argued that the
majority overemphasizes common law.501 Instead, Justice Sandstrom
would simply apply section 47-06-05 and the court’s prior opinions in
Perry v. Erling502 and Greeman v. Smith503 to limit the statute’s application
to property borders defined by the body of water.504

499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

Id. ¶ 13, 869 N.W.2d at 410-11.
Id. ¶ 14, 869 N.W.2d at 411.
Id. ¶ 17 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965).
138 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1965).
Norby, ¶ 19, 869 N.W.2d at 411.

